The Indonesian nationalist struggle produced neither a single nor a dominant political party. Rather, before the declaration of independence in August 1945, during the physical revolution against the Dutch which terminated in December 1949, and in the subsequent years, the nationalist movement has been fragmented into a diversity of political groupings. Even today, after many small parties have disappeared, there remain ten legally active parties; an eleventh, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), is striving to put together an underground apparatus from the ruins of 1965. As each party is the center of a net work of mass organizations, the peasants, youth, women, students and workers are also organizationally fragmented. In Java, these santris
Standing apart from the civilian, aliran-based political groupings are the Indonesian armed forces, of which the 300,000-man army is by far the most powerful. The officer corps of the army8 encompasses a broad ethnic and religious range, but it is extremely rare for a higher officer to have emerged from the lower classes or from either of the santri alirans. The higher officers in general have a comparatively high level of Westerntype education, they enjoy high social status, and they live in an urban environment. Especially those living in or near the large, relatively cosmopolitan cities of Djakarta and Bandung therefore belong to the modernist, non-santri sector of society. At the same time, there is, particularly among ethnic Javanese officers close to traditional Javanese aristocratic culture, a traditionalist component with, as one of its more visible charac teristics, a suspicion of and sometimes open hostility towards the penetration of Western culture.
Indonesian officers may feel an affinity with the civilian political party representing their respective aliran backgrounds more usually the PSI or the PNI, but they have refused to sub ordinate themselves to party control. This is not only because of ordinary institutional loyalty to the army. Men and youths had joined the Republican army for political reasons, and the officers believe that the army, not the civilians, was largely instrumental in the defeat of the Dutch and the creation of an independent Indonesia. Nor was the officers1 sense of apartness superiority and political mission to be reduced by the behavior and "accomplishments" of the aliran-fragmented civilian parties in the period following the Dutch withdrawal. urban santris and many Sundanese of West Java. The NU (tra ditionalist santri), while dominant among santri Madurese and East Javanese, is strong in South Kalimantan. The PNI (tra ditionalist non-santri), though heavily ethnic Javanese, receives significant support outside that base. The PKI, under its Sumatran chairman, D. N. Aidit (1951 Aidit ( -1965 , spread from the ethnic Javanese heartland to include non-traditional moderns across Indonesia. And each Christian party encom passes a wide ethnic range. The alirans, then, are cross ethnic in nature, which helps account for the lack of strong separatist movements in Indonesia. It should also be noted that each aliran, with the exception of those centered polit ically on the PSI and PKI, encompasses a broad range of socio economic classes.
8. So far the rank and file of the army has been politically quiescent. The officers strive to develop a traditionalist bapak (father) relationship with their men.
We have seen that Indonesia attained independence with a multiplicity of political parties and an army whose officers manifested a high elan and political interest as members of a successful nationalist organization. The santris could trace back their nationalist activism to the establishment of the Sarekat Islam in 1912; the PKI to 1920; the PNI to 1927. No major p&rty was willing or able, because each was based on a self-conscious and distinct socio-cultural aliran, to merge its separate identity and interests into an all-embracing single organization. Even the Japanese-enforced temporary unity of the santri groups was sundered with the breakaway from Masjumi of the PSII in 1947, and the NU in 1952.
If the newly independent Republic lacked a dominant nation alist party, it was also wanting in a tested political system. The Dutch had denied Indonesians experience in top-level admin istration and in the processes by which national leadership and policies may be achieved through the aggregation and compromise of a diversity of group and individual interests.
Shortly after the declaration of independence, the Indone sian nationalists opted for a democratic (which meant, in the Indonesian context, multi-party) parliamentary system. This was formally instituted after the Dutch withdrawal in the 1950
Provisional Constitution with its figurehead President and cabinet responsible to a parliament composed of representatives of the political parties. Very few leaders, however, and, of course, none of the masses were especially committed to this system. For parliamentary democracy to have survived, it would have had to win and retain the voluntary allegiance of at least the more important political strata--and this would have occurred only if the democratic system's outputs were satisfactory to them.
But such an accomplishment was highly improbable given a welter of adverse circumstances: society and the party system divided into several, in many ways irreconcilable, groupings; limited material resources available to the state;9 an at best semi-skilled, and soon over-staffed, bureaucracy; a new political system in which the "rules of the game" had still to be agreed upon; and powerful political elements constitutionally either outside the system (the army) or relegated to a minor role within it (President Sukarno).
9. At the time of the peace treaty with the Dutch, December 1949, Indonesia was not only a poor country, but was saddled with nearly $1.13 billions in debts to the Netherlands. Fur thermore, almost all large plantation, commercial and indus trial enterprises were in the hands of either aliens or citizens of Chinese descent. The political system, was, therefore, subject to great pressure from those Indonesians seeking material, status or power advancement.
Parliamentary democracy did not survive.
It degenerated into a succession of immobilist, multi-party coalition govern ments, characterized by feuding within and between the coalition parties and increasing bitterness between the in-parties and the out. The composition of the coalition governments changed, but a pattern of party alignment was already evident by 1954: the ijaodernist Masjumi and PSI on one side, the PNI and NU on the other. While many factors helped produce this alignment, the most fundamental hostility and competition were those between the PNI and Masjumi, largely motored by the formerfs aliran fear of the largest, most dynamic of the santri parties.10 This overriding preoccupation of PNI leaders, shared by President Sukarno, facilitated the latterTs efforts to gain a dominant, albeit indirect, role in the PNI. This preoccupation also opened the way for what became during 1954 a de facto alliance between the PNI and the communists.11
General elections, held at last in September 1955, could not infuse either national unity or national purpose into the parliamentary system. The election campaign produced fresh crescendos of obloquy in the struggle between the opposing par ties. The balloting reduced the number of parties represented in parliament, but as the bulk of the voting proceeded in ac cordance with aliran identity, four parties received roughly 10. It may appear at first sight incongruous that on each side of the alignment a santri party was allied with a secular party. The PNI and NU collaborated because it was mutually beneficial to do so. It served the PNI to foster nonMasjumi santri parties in order to undercut the strength of Masjumi, and to exclude Masjumi from the authority and patronage accruing to government position. Coalition with the NU also muted the Masjumi's outcry that the government excluded Moslems. The NU leaders, embittered from their experience while within Masjumi, gained control of govern ment patronage, especially the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In authoritarian command of their own party, they could easily silence any pleas for united santri political action. The leaders of the PSI and Masjumi, as pragmatic modernists, shared a similar outlook on questions of government policy. It may be significant that their chairmen, Sjahrir and Natsir respectively, were both Minangkabaus. equal votes and several others retained seats.12 A post-elec tion attempt to re-establish a working coalition between the PNI and Masjumi quickly collapsed. By the beginning of 1957, the multi-party system and aliran anxieties and hostilities held the cabinet as immobilist as ever, several regions in the Outer Islands had rejected Djakarta's authority, national prosperity promised through independence remained a mirage, and the Dutch gave ho indication of relinquishing their hold on West Irian. The PKI was by now the largest party on Java, and expanding rapidly elsewhere.
Sukarno was a founder of the original PNI in
At this juncture, many army officers, some of whom were perhaps influenced by PSI leaders,13 voiced strong disapproval of the existing political system. They charged that multi-party democracy exacerbated division within the country, provided the opportunity for the growth of the PKI, and tackled successfully neither economic problems nor the national claim to West Irian. In short, they argued, the party-based governments lacked author ity and purpose, other than the enrichment of party leaders. The alternatives to the existing system were not given precise form, but demands were raised for the abolition of all parties and for firm, authoritative government.
Sukarno responded to this situation by the gradual formula tion of the concept of Guided Democracy, formally initiated in July 1959 by the decreed restoration of the 1945 Constitution.14 From the start, Guided Democracy was an arrangement of conven ience. The officer corps, in command of the most powerful organization in the country, wanted strong government in which the army would play a major role. But while the officer corps could unite to defend its institutional interests, it was too 12. The four main parties received 22.3 (PNI), 20,9 (Masjumi), 18.4 (NU), and 16.4 (PKI) per cent respectively; 24 other political groups received at least one seat under the system of proportional representation.
13. The PSI, while heavy in highly educated supporters, proved light in popular appeal. In the 1955 election, the PSI won only 2.0 per cent of the vote.
14. The 1945 Constitution will be described in greater detail below. It provides for a powerful presidency, and had been shelved shortly after the initial writing. Sukarno acted outside the provisions of the 1950 Provisional Constitution in decreeing the reintroduction of the earlier constitution. The opportunity to do so arose with a deadlock in the Con stituent Assembly, elected in December 1955, between, sig nificantly, the santri parties and the rest. On Guided Democracy, and the circumstances of its formulation, see Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963). deeply fragmented to consider an attempt to rule alone. Sukarno, the most powerful individual in Indonesia and hungry to extend that power, was eager to restore a strong executive, but could not countenance a simple Sukarno-army government. That would have raised the danger of his becoming his partner's captive. The parties were reprieved.
Guided Democracy was at root a competitive alliance between Sukarno and the army leadership. For both partners, there re mained the question of what to do with the political parties. Sukarno might have preferred to create a monolithic state party controlled by himself, but this proved impracticable. Because he needed parties both to counterbalance the army and, through parliament and the MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative Congress),15 to legitimize his rule, he was compelled to accept the aliran-based parties' insistence on retaining their separate identities. He therefore blocked the desire of army officers to ban all parties, and in 1960, his opposition frustrated army attempts to merge all trade unions and youth organizations, most of which were affiliated to the parties, into single, armycontrolled bodies. Sukarno's approach to the parties was a mix ture of coercion and persuasion. Although his dissolution of most minor parties received the approbation of the army and the major parties, in September 1960, he banned Masjumi and the PSI for refusing to render him unquestioning support. The survival of a party became dependent upon its public support for govern ment policies, including public adherence to the principle of Nasakom (nationalist-religious-communist) unity for the comple tion of the Revolution. In this way, the political divisions within the civilian population were either formally removed, or papered over. At the same time, Sukarno provided the leaders of amenable parties with certain rewards: within the limits of open avowal of support for the government, their parties were allowed to continue their activities; they themselves were granted, if not power, wealth, honors and positions of high status (as within the newly appointed legislative bodies). The PKI, now with the added advantage of presidential favor, con tinued both to grow and to educate its cadres. As the largest, best organized and most anti-Western of the parties, it enjoyed the least unequal relationship with the President.
If Guided Democracy was an arrangement of convenience, resulting from the inability of any one political force to eliminate the others, it was also, from the start, necessarily temporary in nature. The system was a juggling act dependent upon the skill of Sukarno in manipulating the fragmented polit ical forces around him. But the juggler was mortal, the archi 15. Under the 1945 Constitution, the MPR(S) is "the highest authority of the State," which determines the broad lines of national policy and elects the President who is responsi ble to it. tect of no dominant political organization that could survive his own removal from the political stage. Further, he was manipulating strongly antagonistic institutions and alirans. The enforced reiteration of national and Nasakom unity only masked mutual hostility, while both the army leaders and the communists believed that eventually one of them must eliminate the other. Guided Democracy also pretended that the modernist santri sector, large in numbers, and the PSI-oriented intellec tuals did not exist.
The six years of Guided Democracy did nothing to reduce the system's inherent contradictions. The santris were resent ful of their exclusion from the center of power, a resentment unalleviated by the status and wealth of a few NU leaders and Sukarno's promise of the largest mosque in Southeast Asia. The continued growth of the PKI, in part due to Sukarno's obvious favor, only served to increase the hostility and fear of the santris and officer corps. But why were the santris and offi cers so bitterly hostile to the PKI? The PKI had wooed the NU as an ally since 1954 and stressed that while the party itself could not espouse a religion, its members certainly could. Com munists had assisted the army central command in the suppression of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion of 1958-1961 and, in recent years, had expressed adherence to the unity of the People and the Armed Forces in the defense and promotion of the Revolution. One source of undying hatred was the abortive communist rebel lion in September 1948. Communists and santris had butchered one another at that time, while the officer corps as a whole viewed the rebellion as an act of treason perpetrated while the young Republic was at war with the Dutch. Both santris and officers saw, in a PKI victory, their own political downfall and probably the physical liquidation of many of their leaders. Moreover, by 1965, the PKI was launching attacks against the ' ' bureaucratic capitalist" officers in charge of Dutch enterprises seized in December 1957 , and against the ' 'feudal" santri land lords.16 In short, then, the santri and army leaders were under no illusion regarding the PKI's goal of total power. No commu nist strategy or tactic, no public affirmation of Nasakom unity, could erase this awareness--an awareness shared by most other non-communist leaders, including those of the PNI. The PKI was unquestionably, whatever its professed appearance, the party of the non-santri, less privileged sector of society, seeking the complete re-ordering of the political and socio-economic systems.
16. In Java, there are few large landlords, but especially in East Java, the relatively large landholdings are often owned by kijais, or Moslem religious scholars. The PKI campaign of 1964 and 1965 against ' 'feudal" landlords was not aimed against santris as such, but the santri community was fully aware that the kiajis were in fact under attack from outside the community. As of the middle of 1965, the PKI leaders knew that despite universal protestation of fidelity to Nasakom unity, their ene mies were still numerous and powerful: the bulk of the officer corps, the santris, most of the better-educated classes, most bureaucrats, and even a majority of the PNI. They also knew that the party's three million members and, even more, the fif teen million or so members of its ancillary mass organizations, were unprepared organizationally, materially, and psychologically for civil war. The party had won substantial support among the lower classes of the traditionalist non-santri aliran in legal competition and with, for some years, the President's assistance. But it had failed to instill class militancy and rejection of established authority in more than a small number. On the other hand, the communist leadership looked forward to several more years of Sukarno as a benevolent president, and therefore the opportunity to work to avoid a clash with the army or, if one were to prove unavoidable, to prepare the party better for that eventuality. The party could continue its efforts to infiltrate the armed forces, build its organization so as to overawe the wavering, consolidate its position as heir-apparent in order to win over the opportunists and loyal Sukarnoists, demonstrate its concern with and competence to solve the manifest problems of the state, prepare its cadres in skills necessary for governing, and heighten the class consciousness (and, hopefully, militancy) of both its cadres and mass following. In addition, President Sukarno, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, and air force chief Omar Dani had consented to the creation of a civilian "Fifth Armed Force" (alongside the army, navy, air force and police) which many feared would consist largely of communists and communist sympathizers. Similar revolution ary councils would be established in the regions, while through out the country, PKI cadres would mobilize the party's masses and Nasakom leaders for petitions, pronouncements and demonstra tions in support of the stated goal of the ' 'internal army affair" : safeguarding the Revolution and its Great Leader. In short, the immediate danger to the PKI would be averted. The core of the anti-communist army leadership would be destroyed and replaced by one less independent of Sukarno and therefore committed to weeding out the remaining reactionaries. And the general tenor of political life would have shifted to the left--without provoking a massive anti-communist reaction.
Six of the seven target generals were killed on schedule; only General Nasution, Minister of Defense and Security, escaped Leadership was seized of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Division and the Jogjakarta regional army command. The radio stations in Djakarta, Semarang, and Jogjakarta were occupied. The member ship of the national Revolutionary Council was announced. And Sukarno gladly consented to appoint Ma j . General Pranoto Reksosamudro, the plotters' choice, as caretaker commander of the army. The President also ordered a halt to all operations for or against the Movement, promising his own determination of a settlement. Everywhere the authorities received broad assistance in seeking out the communists. Their most assiduous assistants were, however, the santri youths who brought to their work the enthusiasm of a holy war. As for the mass killings, these seem to have occurred only where the local army commanders or the RPKAD gave active encouragement.28 In this enterprise, too, the santri youths were the chief civilian participants, whether those in Atjeh, affiliated with the Masjumi before its Sukarnoenforced dissolution in 1960, or those in East and Central Java, mostly from ANSOR, the NU's youth organization.29 The apprehen sion of the communists was facilitated by three circumstances: first, the PKI had been a legal, above-ground organization for over thirteen years, its cadres and members openly active and living among non-communists; second, the party had made no prepa rations for going underground--the necessary haste and secrecy with which the September 30 Movement was formulated gave no time 27. Informed foreign observers have estimated the number of dead as high as one million.
28. I have seen no evidence that Suharto ordered the killings, but he took no action to stop them. General Nasution cer tainly gave thinly veiled exhortations for bloody action--perhaps spurred by the death of a daughter at the hands of the killer squad that attacked his house. The mass killings were, however, confined to a relatively few districts--Atjeh, parts of North Sumatra, parts of Central and East Java, and Bali--in all of which the local commanders or the RPKAD pro moted or facilitated them. Where such army stimulus was withheld, as in the case of the strongly anti-communist Siliwangi (West Java) Division or the Djakarta command, mass killings did not occur.
Parts of North Sumatra where killings occurred are Protest ant;
Bali is, of course, Bali-Hindu. I have found as yet no satisfactory explanation of the ferocity exhibited in these two areas. for this; and third, the party leadership decided to attempt to ride out the storm as innocent victims of calumny, hoping for Sukarno to save them, and waiting until too late to order the cadres underground.3 °O ctober 1 was an even more confusing day for the civilians of Djakarta than for the officers not involved in the totally unexpected September 30 Movement. Neither the radio announce ments nor the unintelligible troop movements gave any indication of the broader political intentions or support of those who had taken action against several generals.
In these circumstances, many political leaders wisely left town or went into hiding or refused to answer callers. Then, for several days after the murders, when the power of Sukarno and the as-yet unbroken PKI still loomed extremely large, it was known that the one had not condemned the Movement while the other had publicly tendered its support.3 0 31 And yet, while the situation was still in doubt, a few civilians did take action to use the September 30 Movement as the excuse for a public attack on the Communist Party. On October 4, 1965, KAP-Gestapu held its first public rally. A few hundred attended. The rally endorsed a statement urging Sukarno to ban the PKI and its mass organizations, close all newspapers that had expressed support for Gestapu, and effect a purge, from the cabinet downwards, of all who had supported, assisted or sympathized with Gestapu. The statement was signed by persons claiming to represent twenty-five organizations: twenty-three of them were santri, mostly of former Masjumi affil iation; only two were non-santri, the Front Katolik (the body which brought together the Partai Katolik and its ancillary organizations) and IPKI (a small, secular political party with army connections).
By the evening of October 1, several Moslems had met and agreed to form a Moslem Action
On October 5, the NU finally called for the dissolution of the PKI and its mass organizations; at about the same time, the NU leadership unofficially encouraged its East Java adherents to physically eradicate the communists. A second KAP-Gestapu rally, held on October 8, gathered a crowd of several thousands.
By this date the Protestants had joined. After the rally, the PKI central headquarters was sacked, with the assist ance of a passing army patrol. On October 21, a KAP-Gestapu statement reiterating the demands of October 4 was signed by Subchan as chairman, Harry Tjan (an ethnic Chinese and secretarygeneral of the Partai Katolik) as secretary-general, and all political parties except the PKI and PNI-Ali.33
In short, KAP-Gestapu was the initiative of Subchan, stu dents and youth of santri organizations, and Catholics, with the blessing of the army central leadership. Only when it became clear that army benevolence had been extended, that SukarnoTs will was being flouted in the issue, and that the crushing of the PKI had begun with little if any resistance, did all parties he had assisted HMI against violent PKI demands for its dis solution. He is, in short, a modernist belonging to a basically authoritarian and traditionalist party. esides KAP-Gestapu, KAMI was the other major civilian or ganization to press the attack on the PKI in defiance of Sukar n o^ expressed wishes. KAMI was also formed with the armyTs blessing, on October 25, 1965, as an alliance of several student associations and individual students.
In
Its strength was, and re mains, concentrated in the two large, relatively cosmopolitan cities of Djakarta and Bandung, more specifically in three elite universities: the University of Indonesia in the capital, and the University of Padjadjaran and the Technical Institute in Bandung. Very few activists were non-santri ethnic Javanese al though the students in Djakarta and Bandung came from all over Indonesia. The leadership came to consist of the santris in HMI and PMII (the small NU university students1 association), the Roman Catholic students in their own association, PMKRI, and what I term, for convenience, PSI-type students. Many of this last group were independents, some were members of the IPKI student association, MAPANTJAS, and others of SOMAL, the federa tion of local university student associations. While all stu dents in the elite universities have a relatively high level of Western-style education, by PSI-type, I mean those who are also secularized, highly Westernized, and often, as is generally the case with Indonesian university students, from urban families of reasonable means; that is, of the outlook and background associated far more with the PSI than with any other party.3 4 35 As in the case of KAP-Gestapu, the PNI and Protestant student organizations gave at best lukewarm support to KAMI.
In short, the attack on the Communist Party was spearheaded by an alliance comprising the army officer corps, the santris, both modernist and traditionalist (the erstwhile Masjumi affili ates usually taking action ahead of the more cautious NU leader ship since they had less to lose from SukarnoTs wrath), the To destroy the PKI, or even to endorse its destruction, en tailed a rejection of SukarnoTs authority, at least on one im portant issue.
But the active anti-communists were careful to render all public deference to the President, to call themselves progressive revolutionaries, and to give noisy adherence to all of Sukarno's policies and teachings other than Nasakom unity. Gestapu was condemned by them, if not by Sukarno, as a counter revolutionary coup to overthrow the beloved President. It was possible that Sukarno could have retained most, if not all, of his authority, certainly his title, wealth and palaces, if only he had joined the condemnation of the communists. But he did not.
It is difficult to explain this self-destructive stubborn ness. Perhaps Sukarno was too old to adjust to a radically altered situation.
Perhaps he had become dependent on the advice of the communist leaders. Perhaps he calculated that the PKI or a neo-PKI was essential if he was to prevent army dominance. Perhaps, too, the adulation and success of the preceding years led him to overestimate the power of his charisma and manipula tive skills.36 Whatever the reason, he condemned the mass kill ings, affirmed his belief in the partyfs innocence, praised the communists' nationalist and progressive record, and even gave one Politbureau member, Njoto, the protection of his palace. In January 1966, the civilian radicals were demanding a new cabinet, the dissolution of the PKI, and the cancellation of recent price increases.
Specific non-communist ministers, including Subandrio, were under violent attack. Constant stu dent demonstrations kept the capital in turmoil. At this point, Sukarno counterattacked the radicals and, indirectly, their army supporters.
In so doing, he was no longer virtually alone, as he had been in his defense of the PKI.
Among civilians, Sukarno could rely on the support of the PNI-Ali, a few older NU leaders, and some Protestants. The PNI had become publicly committed to the President's vision of a continuous, statist, "romantic," and anti-Western revolution. More importantly, it viewed the reassertion of Sukarno's author ity as the only defense against the resurgence of santri power and the expansion of army power. The PNITs leaders calculated further that their party's future influence and access to patron age depended upon gaining presidential favor, a task made easier by the elimination of the PKI, for the PNI was now the only major non-santri party. As we have seen, several Parkindo and NU leaders owed privileged positions to Sukarno, and remained loyal to him. Parkindo, as the PNI, also feared the santri element in the radical movement.
In the army, many officers still regarded Sukarno with awe and veneration as the father of the nation, Indonesia's first and only president; others owed their positions, or extra riches and favors, to his patronage; some were wedded to his policy of escalating confrontation; and an unknown number quietly hoped to occupy the positions of the Sukarno-defying officers above them. The two ethnic Javanese divisions, the Diponegoro (Cen tral Java) and Brawidjaja (East Java), could be expected to be largely loyal: Sukarno, though part-Balinese by birth, was in many respects a modern Javanese sultan, while his opponents in cluded many santris, Outer Islanders, and Siliwangi officers.37 The navy, especially the KKO (Marine Corps), was generally loyal to Sukarno, if only because he had energetically fostered its growth as a counterweight to the army; most of the KKO, with its headquarters in Surabaja, were also ethnic Javanese. The air force, for similar inter-service reasons, was expected to be loyal. And of immediate availability to Sukarno was the intense ly loyal Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the presidential guard.
The effectiveness of Diponegoro support was severely limited
by the anti-Gestapu purge that was taking place. Further, Suharto is a Diponegoro officer and a former commander of the division.
The internal confrontation of forces occurred during the first ten weeks of 1966. Sukarno threatened ' 'non-revolutionary" officers with dire punishment; instructed non-KAMI students and loyalist troops to use force against the student demonstrators; and called for the formation of a Sukarno Bloc that would in clude and control all political parties and mass organizations. In February, he banned KAMI and, on the 24th, announced a cabinet reshuffle. General Nasution was replaced as Minister of Defense and many who had cooperated with the PKI either appeared or re appeared. On March 10, he harangued the leaders of all parties into a condemnation of the continuing, massive student demon strations. The next day, however, troops surrounded the Djakarta palace where a meeting of the cabinet was in progress. Sukarno left hurriedly by helicopter for the palace at Bogor, forty miles to the south and, in the afternoon, signed the March 11 Order. The order authorized General Suharto "to take any steps considered as necessary to ensure the security, calm and stabil ity of the Government machinery and the process of the Revolu tion." Sukarno had concluded that he must retreat or else risk a civil war of uncertain outcome.
The civilian spearhead thrust against Sukarno's cabinet, its policies, and indirectly, but unmistakably, his authority, consisted of the students of Djakarta and Bandung organized in KAMI. By late 1965, university students had been joined by the highschools. When KAMI came under strong attack from Sukarno forces, the highschool students established their own action front, KAPPI, which took command of the demonstrations after KAMI was banned. As with KAMI, the KAPPI leadership was derived from three groups: the santris, the Catholics, and those of the PSI type.38 By far the largest and most active member organiza tion was, and is, the Masjumi-oriented PII (Moslem Highschool Students).
With the de facto demise of the PKI, KAP-Gestapu lost its momentum, although occasional joint statements were still issued under the new name of Front Pantjasila. When Sukarno launched his attack on the radicals, most party leaders ran for cover, with rare exceptions such as Subchan of the NU and Harry Tjan of the Partai Katolik. The students were left almost totally 38. In July 1966, the KAPPI Presidium consisted of five members from santri associations, one Catholic, one from IPPIPantjasila (a secular, rump organization of highschool stu dents formed after the communists had captured control of the original IPPI), and one from the Association of High school Economics Students. KAPPI leaders said that the Catholics were far less active in KAPPI than in KAMI because the priests had greater control of the students at that level and generally shied away from political involvement.
isolated among civilians and would have succumbed rapidly before the sustained power of loyalist Sukarno armed forces or even of Sukarnoist civilians. They were saved by certain army elements in Djakarta and Bandung.
With few exceptions, the army officer corps had applauded the elimination of the PKI. On the question of SukarnoTs polit ical rqle, however, the army was divided, as we have seen. The vanguard of the efforts within the army first to reduce, then to eliminate, his power was taken by five distinct groups, all of them located in Djakarta and Bandung. The five groups were: the army central command, under General Suharto; the Siliwangi (West Java) Division; KOSTRAD (Strategic Army Reserve); the RPKAD; and a miscellany of officers gathered loosely around General Nasution.
They represented the least provincial, most Western-educated, Westernized, cosmopolitan segment of the offi cer corps. Not surprisingly they drew many political and eco nomic advisors from the PSI and others of a PSI-type background. While the five army groups disagreed on such questions as method and pace, they shared several reasons for wanting to control the President politically.
First, they wished to free the army from what had been the constant intrigues and interference of Sukarno. Second, they wished to preserve, or expand, the increased polit ical authority that the army had acquired since October 1. Third, they wanted no return to the Guided Democracy practice of universal grovelling before the Presidents every utterance. And fourth, they opposed major policies that Sukarno refused to discard. They not only rejected the Presidents continued de fense of the PKI, his repeated and public adherence to Marxism, his embracing of Peking; they wished to end his economically disastrous obsession with anti-Western confrontation and prestige projects, to concentrate the governments efforts on a rationally conceived solution to the nations abysmal economic condition. By March 1966, the leaders of these several military groups also feared that should Sukarno reassert his supremacy, then they as individuals would suffer his wrath for having so openly opposed his will on the communist question and for their support of the civilian radical groups.
Suharto, in control of the army central command, felt it necessary to restrict Sukarno's power for these reasons. Sukar no's continuing intransigence and plotting then forced him to the reluctant conclusion that the national welfare, as he per ceived it, required the complete elimination of the President's power and prestige. His willingness and ability to take action towards that objective increased as he strengthened his control over the armed forces.
The Siliwangi Division is the elite division of Indonesia. Since its creation during the Revolution, the Siliwangi officer corps has been national in origin, rather than from one region, as is the case of most other divisions,39 and of a relatively high level of Western-style education. Because of these charac teristics and perhaps, too, because the division is located near the capital,40 the Siliwangi officer corps has always been unusually concerned with national politics. Meetings of present and past Siliwangi officers are held regularly to discuss the political situation, and Siliwangi officers posted outside the region return frequently to Bandung to discuss politics with the division's commanders.41 The Siliwangi officers exert a politi cal influence far beyond their own region because they have been given command posts elsewhere:42 4 3 they are generally more highly educated and, after October 1, 1965, more reliable polit ically than officers from other divisions. It is not suggested that the separate army activist groups achieved a detailed coordination in their actions towards the common objective. They differed in style and pace. Usually KQSTRAD, the RPKAD and the Siliwangi, with their closer ties to thb student radicals, sought to move more rapidly, more force fully. They were far more overt in their anti-Sukarno inten tions.
KOSTRAD
Suharto, in character, moved cautiously. He conceived the erosion of SukarnoTs power bases to be a gradual process that must neither provoke civil war nor produce a deep aliena tion of the Sukarno loyalists. The Sukarnoists were subjected to persuasion as well as coercion. Sukarno himself was treated with the utmost deference. One witnessed, then, the other ac tivist military groups trying constantly to push Suharto towards a pace and style more consonant with their wishes.
But Suharto was acknowledged by all groups as the highest authority within the officer corps.45 When he considered the civilian radicals to be moving, with army encouragement, in a manner or at a pace likely to provoke a violent reaction, he insisted upon and gained the agreement of all army activist groups to hold the civilians in check.
In addition to the differences of style and pace, there was also a rough, but never complete, division of labor between the activist military groups: Suharto concentrating on consolida tion of non-communist, non-Sukarnoist control of the army and the government apparatus; the RPKAD, KOSTRAD and the Siliwangi on overt threats of violence against the recalcitrant, and on relations with the civilian radicals; and Nasution, as chairman of the MPRS, on ensuring that the decline in Sukarnofs power position received proper constitutional ratification. Sukarno's power bases were undermined by simultaneous ac tion in four separate fields: in the armed forces; in the gov ernment apparatus; in the political parties and their mass organizations; and in parliament and the MPRS.
Control of the armed forces was the decisive factor in the struggle between Sukarno and his opponents. We have seen how Suharto, after the collapse of the September 30 Movement, con solidated his control over the army central command and began both the purge of pro-communists from the armed forces and the In Djakarta, on October 3, troops were used to quell the students' buoyancy, and Sarwo Edhie, commander of the RPKAD, gave them a lecture on political realities. The extreme anti-Sukarno demands were then quietly shelved until mid-December, by which time the military groups were con vinced that Sukarno could be removed without fear of wide spread violence.
Suharto was commander-in-chief

Subandrio was subsequently tried for involvement in the Sep
With the political demise of Sukarno, the Orba (Orde Baru, New Order) forces faced the question of what political system should replace the old. In the struggle against Sukarno, they had committed themselves to certain broad outlines of the future system, for Sukarno had been attacked constitutionally on the grounds that he had transgressed the 1945 Constitution and trampled upon the peoplefs democratic freedoms.
The 1945 Constitution is sparsely worded.57 Nonetheless, the constitution or its appended elucidations state that "the government is based upon constitutionalism, not absolutism"; that one of the fundamental characteristics of the system of government is "sovereignty of the people, based upon democracy and deliberation among representatives." The sovereignty of the people is expressed, at the highest level, through the MPR, "the highest authority of the State," "the embodiment of the whole people." The MPR determines the broad lines of State policy and elects the President, who is both subordinate to and respon sible to it. While the President may initiate legislation, "the position of the Parliament is strong." Parliament is the high est legislative body, while its approval is required for the budget and all laws originating with the executive. Further, parliament may not be dissolved by the President, and its mem bers sit in the MPR to which the President is responsible. In August 1967 I met with ten of the KAMI leaders in Surabaja, a Javanese city. Al though they estimated that ethnic Javanese made up 90 per cent of the university students in the city, only one of the ten had a Javanese name; one or two others, with Arabicderived names, may have been santri Javanese; the remainder were clearly Outer Islanders.
In all, the influence of this older group, working away from the public eye, is difficult to assess with precision.
It seems to have been significant, however, on KAMI, KAPPI and some offi cers of both the army radical and Suharto groups.
The civilian radicals had a relatively high level of Westeirn-style education, were attracted to Western culture, and spared with the army radicals an impatience with Indonesia*s backwardness and a fervent desire to modernize their society with the utmost rapidity. Authority and procedures were not respected as such, but were regarded as instruments for the achievement of goals.
While it is hazardous to generalize for the civilian radi cals as a whole, most leaders of the radical organizations recog nized three aspects of political life. First, that since the army held preponderant power, their goals of modernization and economic development could be achieved only with the support of the army. Second, that they were a small minority in Indonesia, most of the population remaining loyal to the leaders of the major alirans. And third, that the £lan of the anti-Sukarno struggle would soon dissipate unless fresh springs of enthusiasm were found. These acknowledged facts produced symptoms of schizophrenia during 1967 and 1968. On the one hand, the radi cal organizations attacked militarism, government economic poli cies (for example, wage restraints, the removal of subsidies from transportation and fuel, and the low education budget), and corruption in the army, for these were popular targets. By so doing, they alienated many army officers. At the same time, they sought a workable political system, which could unite army power with civilian modernizers and, the cynics would add, in crease their own access to positions and influence.65 Civilians with the necessary expertise would decide how best to achieve modernization and economic development; the armyTs might would then be employed to ensure the implementation of the resultant policies regardless of whatever "vested interests" stood in their way. The civilian radicals were unsure, however, as to what should exist below the strong executive. They insisted upon their own right to express "constructive criticism" of the government, its personnel and its policies.
Beyond that, they toyed with the idea of a one-or two-party system--but this could not be realized, given the aliran basis of political loyalties, without very strong coercion, which Suharto refused to countenance. More persistently, they demanded a thorough revamping of the membership of the MPRS and parliament, and, being themselves a small minority group, an indefinite postpone ment of general elections.
But Suharto, by his use of them against Sukarno in parliament and the MPRS, was at least partially committed to their retention. His desire to operate constitutionally, and wherever possible by consensus, required approval of his poli cies from parliament and the MPRS, in which the parties held major representation.
He also appeared genuine in his claim to want representative democracy (excluding the communists), and this would necessarily include the existing aliran-based parties. Finally, the parties provided Suharto with a "democratic" counter to the pressures of the army radicals. As Sukarno before him, Suharto needed the parties, and this gave them a bargaining lever, if not a very effective one.
Although the parties were as deeply divided as ever from one another, they shared certain common concerns about the future political system.66 By choice, the parties would have preferred the reinstitution of the 1950 Provisional Constitution with a figurehead president and the cabinet responsible to a fully elected parliament.
By necessity they had to accept the 1945 Constitution. They also had to accept large military represen tation in government, the MPRS and parliament. But at the same time, they advanced the demand of the anti-Sukarno campaign: ' 'the pure implementation of the 19 45 Constitution." They stressed ' 'sovereignty of the people," ' ' representativeness," in short, democracy. Democracy was said to require general elec tions as soon as possible, the parties calculating that even if party organizations were dormant, aliran loyalties would produce the votes as in 1955; the PNI could expect to gain most of the formerly PKI votes, in the absence of any other nation-wide, non-religious party, while the santris could expect to double their representation in the presently appointed bodies. Democ racy also required, according to the parties, popular (that is, party) representation in the cabinet, and the revocation of the special powers granted to Suharto (and used also by army com manders below him) in the March 11 Order. But, as with the civilian radicals, the attainment of the parties' goals depended upon the decision of powerful army elements, in this case the Suharto group.
The army radicals, as also their civilian counterparts, became keenly aware during 1967 that they, as self-styled modernizers, constituted but a small minority in the country. From this awareness came an elitist approach to the political system. Their reasoning went roughly as follows: we modern izers, including the Suharto group, are few in number and yet, with the destruction of the PKI and Sukarno, dominant in power; our primary goals are modernization and rapid economic develop ment, but the present nature of the party system, and because of this parliament and the MPRS, serves only to impede the achievement of these goals. We must use the technically skilled civilians in devising and implementing policies. But we also have the opportunity to completely restructure civilian politics. The mass of the people may still be loyal to the aliran-based parties, but they are not highly politicized,67 and that loyalty 66. The exception was the Partai Katolik which provided a dis proportionately high number of civilian radical leaders. As a small minority party with a relatively highly educated, Westernized membership, by late 1967 it leaned heavily towards accepting a thorough reorganization of the party system along lines explored by the army and civilian radicals.
67. It was arguable that the level of politicization had actually declined due to the failure of the party-based parliamentary system, the years of Sukarno's dictatorship, the enforced could be captured by the modernizers if we could achieve sig nificant improvement in the peopleTs welfare. In short, we should ensure five or ten years of strong, purposeful, develop ment-oriented leadership during which constructive criticism would be permitted but impediments would be ruthlessly destroyed. All of this could be achieved within the framework of the 19 4-5 Constitution, suitably manipulated.
During 1967 and early 1968, the army radicals took action concerning three aspects of the political system: the role of the political parties, the composition of parliament and the MPRS, and the nature of the party system. Most of the action was covert, and centered around attempts to persuade Suharto of the correctness of their point of view, either by direct contact or by winning prominent officers to their position. Several times, however, overt action was taken in an attempt to pressure him into acquiescence.
The PNI suffered most from the efforts of the army radicals. During 1967, the party was banned throughout Sumatra, at a time when Sarwo Edhie was regional commander of North Sumatra, and Siliwangi officers controlled the inter-regional command and the other three regional commands on the island. The civilian radi cals vociferously, the army radicals quietly, demanded that the PNI be crushed throughout Indonesia as Sukarnoist, intransigently Old Order, and an erstwhile ally of the PKI. Suhartofs response was to order a nrecrystallizationn of the party, to be effected with army assistance; but he repeatedly declared that the PNI was a legal party entitled to active existence. He appears to have concluded that it would have been political folly to remove all representation from the millions whose loyalties had been focused for years on Sukarno and either the PNI or the PKI. As of mid-1968, a stalemate continued on this question: the PNI retaining legal recognition, but banned in Sumatra and harassed elsewhere by radical army commanders.
By late 1967, the army radicals were giving quiet encourage ment to the action front demand for the dismissal of the "ob structive" parliament, or at least a sweeping purge of Old Order elements from that body (and hence from the MPRS). At the same time, much thought was being given to a complete restructuring of the party system. On this question, the entire radical group was confused.
Some played with the idea of a one-party system, dissolution of Masjumi, and the destruction of the PKI. It should be noted that while factors other than a declining interest in politics were involved, the newspaper circula tion in Indonesia fell from about 1.5 million in mid-1965 to 300,000 or 400,000 in July 1968; Kompas, June 27, 1968.
others with a two-party system.68 The latter would have a "nonideological" basis; that is, there would be two new parties, each competing to achieve modernization and economic develop ment. Or, if that proved infeasible, the present parties would continue to exist, but their individual members would join one pf two competing blocs; one bloc might be pro-government, the pther providing constructive criticism. These notions of one or two parties or blocs to replace the existing seven or eight parties soon ran aground on Indonesian political realities. The existing parties refused to cooperate; the civilian radicals, few in number and concentrated in Djakarta and Bandung, lacked popular roots; and Suharto refused to coerce the party leaders.
The overt action of the army radicals to achieve the recon struction of the party system and the reordering of parliament reached its climax in the early months of 1968. On January 18, the Siliwangi dragooned the leaders of parties, mass organiza tions and regional legislatures into attending a West Java People's Conference for Heightening the Struggle of the New Order.69 The conference reached the unanimous conclusion that Indonesia must abandon totally its present political structure. In its place should be built a two-party system "based on the program of the spiritual and material welfare of the people," coupled with a "refreshing" of the personnel and structure of parliament as a consequence of the new political structure. The people of West Java promised to implement these changes as soon as possible in their own region.
On March 7, 1968, another West Java People's Conference was held on the eve of the MPRS Fifth Session.70 This time Maj. General Dharsono, Siliwangi commander, acted as chairman. The conference, again unanimously, urged that the proposals of January 18 be fought for in the MPRS. Suharto was unmoved, to the relief of the West Java parties.
The army and civilian radicals failed to achieve a drastic restructuring of the party system because they failed to demon strate how it could be effected without massive coercion. They themselves were prepared to employ as much force as necessary, but Suharto refused. And almost none of them wished to challenge 68. It is significant that none envisaged a no-party system.
The radicals believed that rapid economic development would depend in part on mobilizing the people's enthusiasm for the task and saw some sort of party or parties as essential for this. Army officers were also sensitive to the charge of militarism, while the radicals among them, believing rapid economic development to be dependent on Western assistance, feared Western condemnation of a military dictatorship. Certainly the multi-party system remained in being, with the stipulation of elections in three years. But the radicals had failed to show a workable alternative, Suhartofs combination of persuasion and pressure had produced results, the electoral system was still to be determined, and, if necessary, the elections could presumably be postponed as they had been repeatedly since 1955. In their drive for moderniza tion and economic development, they worked with and through civilians of similar outlook and relevant expertise. Indonesia was not a military dictatorship along the lines of Ayub KhanTs Pakistan. Rather, guided democracy had replaced Guided Democradv.
See Kebulatan Tekad Rakjat
Although PSI-type civilians exerted the greatest influence on the military power-holders, the new political system also accommodated the interests of all major alirans but one. With the one exception, each aliran was permitted its own political organization and representation in the cabinet and legislatures. If party sails were trimmed to meet the government's wind, they had already been so for more than a decade and a far broader range of criticism was tolerated than during the Sukarno era.75 Moreover, army power protected the non-santris from possible santri domination.
If the santris were politically disappointed after the removal of Sukarno, at least the communist danger had been averted and the modernists had gained their own PMI. This accommodation of aliran interests was fully satisfactory to none, but neither was it an anathema to any. However, the new system did not incorporate the non-santri, non-traditional aliran that had been politically mobilized mainly through the Communist Party. Present and former communist activ ists were hunted mercilessly; former members of the PKI and its mass organizations were prohibited from joining other organizations . The government appeared to believe that in the short run this aliran could be politically suppressed, but that in the longer run the loyalty of the mass of its constituents could be captured by the government's achievements in the economic sphere. The extent and intensity of continuing sympathy for the PKI as well as the lasting political effects of the massive bloodletting remained unknown. Meanwhile, the surviving communist cadres were testing the efficacy of their new strategy of armed agrarian revolution.
The new political system contained one other source of potentially severe disruption: the relations between the army and the civilians. No civilian applauded army power as such; all deplored army privileges, arrogance and corruption. Unless the army leaders trod warily, they could create intense and multi-aliran hostility to themselves and the government they maintained.
Such hostility would impede the implementation of the government's economic program. And this in turn would pro duce both a greater antagonistic polarization between the army and the civilians and the likelihood of disruption within the officer corps.
75. The range of permissible criticism extended from the radical student Mahasiswa Indonesia, published in Bandung, to El Bahar, a Djakarta newspaper of anti-capitalist and antlT Western Sukarnoisms published by the navy-KKO.
